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CNS

10 May 1968


MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Status of Recommendations



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Attached for your information is a copy of the Subject report, prepared as at 1 April 1968.



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Chief, Special Security Unit, DDP

Attachment

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GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

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1 April 1968

STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE [REDACTED]

Recommendation #1 - TD/OS be increased by twenty-four (24) additional officers.

The Deputy Director for Support has verbally authorized the Office of Security to proceed on a limited basis with the recruitment of candidates for the Technical Division within total Office of Security ceiling. During FY-68, seven (7) candidates were recruited and it is planned to recruit ten (10) additional candidates during FY-69. Total TD/OS professional personnel strength as of 1 April 1968 [REDACTED]

Recommendation #2 - That OS/TD be allotted an additional \$250,000 for the purchase of necessary equipment.

The Office of Security was given \$267,000 for the purchase of [REDACTED] A DDS memorandum for the Office of Programming, Planning and Budgeting dated 17 July 1967, requested PPB to allocate

Recommendation #3 - That OS not undertake any new responsibilities, i.e., joint-inter-Agency countermeasures training, until OS/TD has absorbed additional personnel.


The Executive Director-Comptroller for the Agency has accepted the request of TSCC for CIA to be Executive Agent for inter-Agency countermeasures training. Within CIA, the Office of Security will be the Executive Agent and the first course is scheduled to be given early in FY-69 at [REDACTED] The inter-Agency training task will require the time of three (3) OS/TD engineers full time (out of existing T/O).

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Recommendation #4 - That CI/TC add one (1) additional officer to its staff.

An additional officer has been added to Mr. [] staff.



Recommendation #6 - That the responsibility for business machines technical security be assigned to the Office of Communications.

The Deputy Director for Support has concurred in this recommendation and has requested the Office of Communications to draft and coordinate an appropriate Headquarters and Field Notice. The drafts, entitled []

[] are presently in the coordination phase.

Recommendation #7 - That there be established an inter-CIA working group to coordinate technical security efforts within the Agency.

In lieu of a committee approach to the problem, the DDP has established a Special Security Unit which has carried out these functions since 28 February 1967.

Recommendation #8 - That war games be continued and this type of testing be increased to include OC-SPS.

This approach is continuing and certain equipment has been tested by OC-SPS as well as TSD and OS/TD. More of this type of activity has been planned for the future.

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Recommendation #9 - That security safeguards and nullification procedures be strengthened in the field, i.e., alarms, plugs and jacks, radios, filters, etc.

We are carrying out this recommendation. Book dispatches have been disseminated which defined the problem and have made specific reference to the control of typewriters, utilization of radios to mask conversations, use of plugs/jacks and buzzer boxes, use of acoustically secure rooms for dictation, etc. As additional acceptable devices for this purpose become available, the field will be notified. The production of an acceptable surreptitious entry detector device is being pressed.



Recommendation #11 - Have at least one secure conference room in each overseas location.

The DDP did not concur in this recommendation since he did not feel it was necessary to have secure conference rooms in all locations. The DDP did concur that there should be secure conference rooms in sensitive locations of a priority nature. In the Clandestine



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
Recommendation #12 - That at least two acoustically shielded conference rooms be installed in the Headquarters Building.

The Executive Director-Comptroller did not concur in this recommendation. However, it is the feeling of SSU and OS/TD that it would be useful to have one secure room in the Washington area which could be used, among other things, for demonstrations and equipment testing.



Recommendation #14 - Nullification devices such as the Hush-A-Phone be made available to stations not having secure rooms.

Agreement has been reached in the Clandestine Services that the Hush-A-Phone is an effective nullification device but, due to its configuration, user acceptability and size, is also limited in its application. Hush-A-Phones are available commercially and are being shipped to those overseas stations and bases which have requested them. To date, Hush-A-Phones have been sent to  stations. In the immediate future, a Book Dispatch will be forwarded to all stations advising of the availability of the Hush-A-Phone and other available nullification devices.



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Recommendation #18 - That "78" teams be assigned a part-time countermeasures mission.

The use of "78" teams will not be considered until we have made full use of Agency personnel for this purpose.

Recommendation #19 - Redesign countermeasures inspection procedures to place emphasis on thoroughness of inspection as opposed to frequency of inspection.


Consistent with the countermeasures program and the available staff, this type of coverage is being put into effect. Initially, this type

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Recommendation #21 - Unannounced, unscheduled, surprise technical inspections should be conducted.

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This can be done in some stations but not in others, i.e.,
[redacted] It is the policy of
Technical Division/OS, when Area Divisions and Chiefs of Station
concur, to conduct "unannounced" inspections where feasible.
Experience has shown such surprise visits can be more effectively
scheduled by Regional teams resident in the general area of the
station to be inspected.

Recommendation #22 - Visual examination and demolition is recommended as
a major part of the technical inspections.

Visual examinations are being performed in technical inspections
and special destruction programs have been conducted in several
selected stations abroad. It is contemplated that when certain NE
stations reopen, comprehensive demolition inspections will be con-
ducted.

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Recommendation #34 - Pertinent parts of the [redacted] should be disseminated to USIB agencies through the TSCC.

Many of these recommendations have been discussed among the member agencies and to an extent within the TSCC. However, since recommendations are geared to the problems of the Agency and not necessarily applicable to other agencies, portions of this report have not been disseminated to USIB agencies.

Recommendation #35 - Pertinent portions of this survey should be disseminated to field stations for their information and guidance.

Selected topics from this report have been submitted to field stations as Book Dispatches. Since the inception of SSU, nine (9) Book Dispatches dealing with various aspects of security of overseas installations have been disseminated to all stations and bases. Other information contained in this report has been relayed to the field through the SSU teams which have visited [redacted] bases.

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